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Research Article
Convergences and divergences in mortality.




Abdel Omran's 1971 theory of "Epidemiologic Transition" was the first attempt to
account for the extraordinary advances in health care made in industrialized countries
since the 18th century. In the framework of the Demographic Transition, it implied a
general convergence of life expectancies toward a limit imposed by the new
epidemiological features of modern societies. However, important failures, occurred in
the past decades (mainly the health crisis in Eastern Europe and AIDS in Africa), seem
to have stopped that process of convergence. In fact such failures do not really
contradict the theory.
The latter is much more ruined by the unexpected dramatic improvement in the
field of cardiovascular disease experienced since the seventies, which results in a new
step of a more general process. On the basis of the broader concept of “Health
Transition” initiated by Julio Frenk et al., the present paper tries to rethink the full
process in term of divergence/convergence sequences inferred by successive major
changes in health technologies and strategies.
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1. Introduction
Abdel Omran's 1971 theory of “epidemiologic transition” was the first attempt to
account for the extraordinary advances in health care made in industrialized countries
since the 18
th century. According to Omran, all societies experience three "ages" in the
process of modernization: the "age of pestilence and famine", during which mortality is
high and fluctuating, with an average life expectancy under 30 years; the "age of
receding pandemics", during which life expectancy rises considerably, from under 30 to
over 50; and the "age of degenerative and man-made diseases", during which the pace
of the mortality decrease slackens, while the disappearance of infectious diseases
increases the visibility of degenerative diseases, and man-made diseases become more
and more frequent. At the time Abdel Omran was developing his theory of
epidemiologic transition, the most knowledgeable specialists, including United Nations
experts, saw life expectancies as generally converging (Note 1) towards a maximum
age, with the most advanced countries appearing very close to it. According to the
United Nations World Population Prospects, the point of convergence was 75 years
(United Nations, 1975). In point of fact, in the most advanced countries, the increase in
life expectancy slowed down during the 1960s and in some countries has even halted, in
particular as concerns men.
The cardiovascular revolution of the 1970s ushered in a new period of progress.
However, Jay Olshansky and Brian Ault (1986), followed by Richard Rogers and
Robert Hackenberg (1987), while not taking issue on the basic premises of
epidemiologic transition theory, introduced the idea of a "fourth stage" (Note 2) during
which the maximum point of convergence of life expectancies would increase due to
advances in the treatment of cardiovascular diseases. Jay Olshansky et al. (1990) set
this new maximum at 85 years, the same as that chosen by the United Nations at the end
of the 1980s for all countries (United Nations, 1989). Today, however, the 85-year
threshold is heavily criticised by many authors who believe that no such limit can be set
(Vaupel, 2001; Carey and Judge, 2001; Barbi et al., 2003).
Furthermore, the epidemiologic transition, even revised by Olshansky and other
authors, seems to be challenged by dramatic exceptions observed since the 1960s in the
general trend of increasing life expectancy. Not only have many countries (in particular
eastern European countries) lacked the means to experience the cardiovascular
revolution, but a number of others, especially in Africa, have not yet completed the
second phase of epidemiologic transition, and are now hard hit by the emergence of
new epidemics like AIDS, or the resurgence of older diseases (Caselli et al., 2002).
That notwithstanding, these failures however significant do not call into question
the epidemiologic transition theory as such. Yet they do indicate that some countries,
for reasons inherent to their own history, economic development or culture, haveDemographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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encountered serious obstacles that prevent them from completing certain stages of the
transition. In eastern Europe, on one hand, the communist regimes relied almost too
exclusively on the centralized administration of modern health care, whereas the shift
towards the fourth stage of epidemiologic transition requires significant changes in
individual behaviour and being actively responsible for one’s own health. In addition,
the economies of these countries were involved in a ruinous arms and space race with
western countries, leaving them without the means necessary to create an efficient
health system to deal with chronic diseases. On their side, the countries of sub-Saharan
Africa, which are much more vulnerable to the generalized transmission of HIV due to
widespread multiple partnership practices and the wide variability of partner age
differentials, were very hard pressed by the epidemic at a time when their very fragile
economies were facing a global economic crisis which had already, as it was, wrought
its inevitable consequences on quite poor local health services. Prevention methods, and
more recently medical treatments, do exist and have proven effective in northern
countries, but for the time being Africa cannot afford them. In both cases, health care
policies must be improved and adequately funded in order for these countries to achieve
their epidemiologic transition.
Abdel Omran's theory of epidemiologic transition may run up against a more
profound contradiction in the renewed sharp rise in life expectancy observed in Western
countries since the 1970s. Would adding a fourth phase to Omran's initial theory
(Olshansky and Ault, 1986; Rogers and Hackenberg, 1987; Omran, 1998) and again a
fifth to take on board AIDS (Olshansky et al., 1998) suffice to account for such a
phenomenon? In our view, the theory itself must be revised. First, as we have said, the
reasons behind the emergence or resurgence of infectious diseases are not different
from those governing the second phase of Omran's transition: the danger of infection
can never be completely eradicated, only brought under control, and if the battle is
fought in unfavourable conditions, all that has been gained can suddenly be lost, as
shown by the dramatic situation in Africa. In fact, the situation of eastern Europe and
Africa does not so much challenge Omran's theory as question the idea that life
expectancies are rapidly converging towards a maximum level. In addition, Western
advances in the treatment of cardio-vascular diseases since the 1970s can be explained
by the development of a new strategy based on advanced medical technology and
changes in individual behaviour, diet in particular. But not all countries are equally
prepared to adopt these new strategies, as can be seen in eastern Europe. However, in
many developing countries which have exceeded a life expectancy of 70 years, the
question must be put: will they manage to catch up with western countries in this field,
as they did with infectious diseases? Following the proposal made ten years ago by
Julio Frenk et al. (1991), the concept of epidemiologic transition might usefully be
replaced by the wider concept of "health transition", which would include not only theDemographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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development of epidemiologic characteristics within the overall health situation, but
also the ways in which societies respond to the health situation and vice versa (Caselli,
1995; Meslé and Vallin, 2000). On that broader canvas, our more modest aim here is to
explore the possibility of summarising the historical process within a blueprint that
might square with most of the observed trends in mortality.
Arguably, each major improvement in matter of health is likely to first lead to a
divergence in mortality since the most favoured segments of the population benefit
most from the improvement. When the rest of the population accesses the benefit of the
improvement (through improved social conditions, behavioural changes, health
policies, etc.), a phase of convergence begins and can lead to homogenisation until a
new major advance occurs. The entire health transition process thus breaks down into
successive stages, each including a specific divergence-convergence sub-process.
Arguably, from the 18
th century to the present, at least two and even perhaps three of
these successive stages have occurred or are developing.
2. Omran’s epidemiologic transition as the first stage of health
     transition
For thousands of years, and notwithstanding dramatic one-off changes at different times
and places, human life expectancy probably never exceeded 30 to 35 years for very
long until the mid-18
th century. This is not to say that the epidemiological profile was
constant. To the contrary, recent studies by health historians highlight the succession of
pathocenoses which from the dawn of prehistory have been characterised by a specific
epidemiological dynamic founded on specific pathological patterns (Biraben, 1996).
However, in mid-18
th century Europe, a new era began in which the switch from one
pathocenose to the next one is also reflected by a critical and sustainable improvement
in life expectancy. Within approximately two centuries, the epidemiological profile of
European populations changed completely, and explaining this change is the main
purpose of Omran’s theory of the epidemiologic transition. At the end of this historical
process, which can be put at around the mid-60s, chronic diseases replaced infectious
diseases as the main causes of death, while man-made diseases emerged as an
additional factor in the global stagnation of life expectancy.
However, just as the industrial revolution was born in Europe, so the pattern of
epidemiologic transition was first seen in Europe before spreading to the rest of the
world, and even there, in some countries before others. Even now, not all countries have
completed that process.Demographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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2.1. The pioneers
Between the turn of the 18
th century and the 1960s, the history of industrialized
countries and especially European populations fits in quite well with Omran’s theory.
During this period, life expectancy improved dramatically from its ancestral level of 30-
35 years to reach about 70 years in the mid-1960s. This, it is well-established, was
almost exclusively due to the near eradication of infectious mortality. The big historical
epidemics were initially contained mainly by administrative rules preventing the
population from contamination (Biraben, 1975). Then, major advances in agriculture
and food distribution not only led to the disappearance of famine and starvation, still a
concern up to the mid-18
th, and even still in the 19
th century in some parts of Europe
(Reinhard et al., 1968), but also reduced a large share of current mortality due to the
synergic complex malnutrition/infection (McKeown, 1976). These improvements were
reinforced mainly in the 19
th century by major investments in drinking water and
sewerage systems. Finally, medical innovation, especially with the Pasteur era, from
immunization to antibiotics, combined with the establishment of social security
systems, provided modern industrialized society with near-total protection against
major infectious causes of death.
However, not all populations and countries benefited from this progress
simultaneously, even in Europe or among other industrialized countries. Figure 1 shows
the available data on female life expectancy (Note 3) for selected countries. While very
few observed trajectories cover the whole of the two centuries involved, it is quite clear
that less than a handful of countries pioneered early sustainable improvements in life
expectancy. This improvement started in the latter half of the 18
th century in France and
England and Wales, but also in Sweden which is not included in Figure 1 to make it
easier to read. It is very likely that countries like Denmark and Norway were also
among the pioneers, despite the later start of their historical series of life expectancy.
Conversely, many European countries, especially in southern and eastern parts of
Europe, enter the trend much later. For example, continuous life expectancy
improvements did not begin in Italy before the end of the 19
th century, and Figure 1
suggests that the same applies to Hungary. This is also the case of several other
Mediterranean or eastern European countries not included in Figure  1 for ease of
interpretation. The onset came even later in Russia.Demographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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Source: Denmark: Andreev, 2002; England & Wales: Wrigley and Schofield (1981); France: Vallin and Meslé (2001); other
countries: various statistical or demographic yearbooks and historical series.
Figure 1: Long-term trends in female life expectancy for selected industrialized
countries until the mid-60s
Among non-European industrialized countries, Figure  1 picks up two typical cases:
New Zealand at the top and Japan at the bottom. Unfortunately, life expectancy series
start only around the 1890s for both countries, but it is very likely that New Zealand
was among the pioneers, since the commencement of its series show the country to be
far ahead of the others, and it will for long enjoy the highest life expectancy in the
world (Oeppen and Vaupel, 2002). Conversely, it was not until the Meiji era that Japan
would enter its phase of continuous increase in life expectancy. Thus, depending on
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at different times from the late 18
th to the early 20
th century, but from this point the
most recent arrivals advanced more rapidly than the pioneers and the aggregate progress
made over these two centuries produced a first stage reflected in major divergences,
followed by a second in which all these countries dramatically converged towards the
highest level of life expectancy permitted by the reduction in the burden of infectious
mortality.
Intuitively, we added two dotted lines to Figure 1 to try and represent the upper
and lower limits in between which the life expectancy improvements occurred in
industrialized countries. Because very few points are available from the beginning, but
also due to conflicting estimates produced for England and Wales and France, where it
cannot be determined to what extent these represent real differences or results from
methodological issues, it is difficult to accurately estimate the interval of variation
which characterized the pre-transitional stage, but we would contend that most female
life expectancies might have ranged between 30 and 35 years. It is much clearer to see
that in the mid-1960s, all countries were within very narrow ranges of under 5 years
between 72 and 76. Contrast this with the turn of the 19
th century, when these countries
ranged between 33 and 60 years of life expectancy, meaning a gap of approximately 27
years.
2.2. The spread to developing countries
This completion of a first wave of health progress according to Omran’s theory also
appears to be in progress around the rest of the world, at least since the mid-20
th
century. Using the United Nations database on demographic indicators, the left graph of
Figure 2 shows the life expectancy trajectories of all developing countries since 1950,
except sub-Saharan African countries, which follow a different path, and some specific
countries which experienced devastating wars or other political strife.Demographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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Source: United Nations (2001)
Figure 2: Long-term trends in female life expectancy for developing countries
except sub-Saharan Africa and countries affected by war
Even though the time frame of the database used does not portray the full picture for
most of these countries, it appears very likely that around the 1950s this huge
geopolitical aggregate was almost at its peak divergence in terms of life expectancy.
With female life expectancies above 65 years, countries like Hong Kong and Puerto
Rico were already at levels very close to those of industrialized countries, while others
like Yemen, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh were still at levels close to those of 18
th
century Europe - between 30 and 35 years. Then, in the last five decades, most life
expectancy trajectories began converging. Arguably, Hong Kong's trajectory must be
taken in isolation as having been closer to that of industrialized countries over the
period, and having actually entered the second stage which will be discussed in the
following section. By contrast, Puerto Rico is probably still at the end of the first stage,
and, the pace differential between Puerto Rico and Yemen's trajectories gives a fairly
clear picture of that convergence between most of the developing countries which will
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these two trajectories are shown together with those of two intermediate but much more
populous countries, Mexico and Indonesia, compared against three dotted lines.
The two lower dotted lines are a repetition of those in Figure 1 advanced by 60
years to fit with the starting level of the latest countries. Two things stand out. First, the
range of life expectancies at the stage of maximum divergence was greater for to-day's
developing countries than for industrialized countries in the past: in the late 1950s, with
a female life expectancy of 35 years, Yemen was 36 years lower than Puerto Rico (71),
whereas the maximum gap for industrialized countries stood at 27 years . Second, the
latest developing countries improved their life expectancy much more rapidly in recent
decades than European countries did previously. Within 45 years, Yemen gained 28
years of life expectancy while the lower dotted line indicates a gain of 13 years. Third,
even a country like Mexico, where female life expectancy was already over 50 years in
the early 1950s, still for a further two or three decades achieved very rapid additional
gains. It is a matter of record that as early as the 1920s and 1930s for the most advanced
ones, and especially after World War 2, most developing countries made very rapid
progress when they were able to take up European methods of infectious disease control
and disseminate their benefit among their population. During this time, developing
countries completed most of Omran’s epidemiologic transition. Did they achieve more?
The upper dotted line on the right-hand graph of Figure 2 shows the actual non-
advanced Norwegian trajectory. No developing countries cross it (except Hong Kong).
But Puerto Rico was already nearing it as early as the late 1960s, and thereafter
continued to increase at the same pace as Norway. This may indicate that this type of
developing country had already reached stage two, which will be discussed below.
2.3. Is sub-Saharan Africa really an exception?
By contrast, a series of countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, seem to be exceptions
to this globalization of the first stage of health transition. Not only did a number of
conflicts and other forms of political unrest in recent decades put individual countries
outside the scheme of Omran’s epidemiologic transition but sub-Saharan countries
seem to remain more systematically outside the process for a variety of reasons.
Obviously, significant though they are, wars and conflicts have only a passing
impact on life expectancy. Usually, they create an exceptional blip before life
expectancy very quickly resumes its long term trend. Such was the case in many
European countries, especially with the two World Wars. It is also the case for
developing countries like Iran and East Timor. In other cases, the recovery is less clear
because conflicts are protracted or followed by economic and social problems, as in
Iraq, Rwanda, Liberia and Somalia. Nevertheless, these cases do not constitute realDemographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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exceptions to the epidemiologic transition, since the scheme posits a normal economic
and social change ending in Omran’s “third age”.
Sub-Saharan Africa probably calls for more comment. A comparison of the pace
of life expectancy increase observed in these countries to that of Yemen or Indonesia
(Figure 3) reveals two different situations. The left-hand graph shows countries that
enjoyed fairly steady but much slower progress than Indonesia and Yemen, while the
right-hand graph portrays countries hit by a severe AIDS epidemic.
Source: United Nations (2001)
Figure 3: Long-term trends in female life expectancy for sub-Saharan Africa
In countries where life expectancy is low and which are still very close to the “age of
pestilence and famine”, progress is initially slow, since there is no infrastructure and
early gains benefit only a small proportion of the population, usually the urban
population. Later, the health care system swings into play, simple and effective means
for controlling the major epidemics spread to the population as a whole, and gains in
life expectancy acquire momentum. This change in the pace of progress was in
evidence even before Omran posited his theory (Bourgeois-Pichat, 1966; Vallin, 1968),
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Saharan Africa (Meslé and Vallin, 1996b). The fact is that many sub-Saharan countries
have experienced a fairly slow improvement in life expectancy since the 50s, whatever
their then level (Figure 3, left). For example, Ghanaian life expectancy was already
close to 45 in 1950, much higher than that of Indonesia, but advanced much more
slowly. In many of these countries, furthermore, life expectancy improvements slowed
down after 1980, which is even more striking. Arguably, however, these unusual trends
in the developing world do not necessary contradict the theory. Firstly, because no
trajectory on the left-hand graph of Figure 3 falls below the lower dotted line which
represents the slowest rate of the European transition. It is readily understandable that
sub-Saharan Africa, where the economic take-off was much more difficult than
anywhere else in the Third World, should experience paces of progress closer to those
of European countries than those of most developing countries. Secondly, because the
slowdown observed since 1980 is clearly linked to the economic recession which hit
Africa harder than any other developing country after the crisis in the world economic
system of the late 1970s. Structural adjustment plans cut heavily into social and health
budgets, producing a break in the life expectancy trends. Again, this is more an
exception that confirms the rule than a fundamental contradiction to the general
scheme.
Furthermore, not all sub-Saharan countries were so slow from the 1950s. As the
right-hand graph of Figure 3 shows, several countries that were recently hit by AIDS
made life expectancy gains at the same pace as Yemen and Indonesia up to the 1980s.
This was especially so for southern and eastern African countries like South Africa,
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Kenya, Uganda, etc., where economic progress far outpaced that
of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Unfortunately, all the countries in the right-hand
graph of Figure 3 were severely hit by AIDS regardless of their previous pace of life
expectancy increase. In some cases, life expectancy dropped even below the lower
dotted line. However, again it can be argued that this trend reversal is not necessarily
inconsistent with the theory. AIDS was a new disease and as such took time to be
addressed by modern medicine. In fact, since it occurred when much of the world had
already completed the first stage of health transition, medical responses were very
quickly brought to bear in comparison with new diseases of the past (retrovirus was
isolated within a couple of years and triple therapy set within a decade). Nevertheless,
even in the most developed countries, AIDS epidemics spread very rapidly among at-
risk groups, who were hard-hit by very high mortality rates. It took a particularly heavy
toll in many sub-Saharan African countries for two reasons. First, due to specific sexual
behaviour, the main means of transmission was heterosexual and the epidemics caused
devastation among the general population. Second, because of the economic and health
situation in Africa, the affected groups were unable to draw substantial benefit from the
very costly treatments developed in western countries. Once again, it is more probablyDemographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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the pre-requisites for the application of the theory that are lacking than the theory itself
which is flawed.
To conclude on sub-Saharan Africa, it is clear that for several major reasons, the
first stage of health transition is progressing much more slowly than in most developing
countries, and has even been held back in the past two decades.
3. A second stage: the cardiovascular revolution
It is now a matter of record that Omran’s third age, “the age of degenerative and man
made diseases” was not the final one. Not only, have most of the man-made diseases of
the time been under control and finally decreased since the end of 1960s, but a new
major step in life expectancy improvement was taken with the successful fight against
cardio-vascular diseases. Arguably, however, it is not an adequate interpretation to see
that historical event simply as a fourth “age” of Omran’s epidemiologic transition.
Rather, it is an entirely new process of divergence-convergence based on a completely
new approach to health, the success of which depends very much on society's current
capacity to fit in with it. That new step, in fact, began with a dramatic divergence
between the two main parts of the industrialized world divided by their social and
political systems: East and West.
3.1. A new phase of divergence
Figure 4 shows very clearly that, after the high degree of convergence experienced with
the generalized decline in infectious mortality across the industrialized world (figure 1),
the mid-60s mark the start of a new divergence in life expectancy changes. On one
hand, all western countries re-established rapid progress in the late 60s after the more or
less significant slowdown that many had experienced during that decade, while, by
contrast, the ground rapidly made up by eastern countries was followed by a long
period of stagnation or even deterioration.Demographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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Source: France: Vallin and Meslé, 2001; Russia: Meslé et al. 1998; Ukraine: Meslé and Vallin, in press; other countries: various
statistical and demographic yearbooks.
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The widest divergence is observed between Japan, which never experienced any
slowdown and where the pace of progress was especially rapid, and Russia, which has
been facing the worst situation since the end of Omran’s epidemiologic transition. From
1965 to 2000, life expectancy (both sexes) increased from 71 to 81 years in Japan, but
fell from 69 to 66 years in Russia. While the contrast was less stark between other
countries, the trend was systematic enough to make a clear divide between West and
East at least until the late 80s. At that time, even between the least distant countries of
the two groups, the Czech Republic and the United States, there was an almost four-
year difference, when the two countries were level-pegging in 1965.
That divergence continues to-day for countries of the former USSR, represented
here by Russia and Ukraine, despite the wide fluctuation of the late 80s and early 90s,
mainly due to Gorbachev's anti-alcoholism campaign and the socio-economic shock of
the abrupt switch to a market economy (Meslé et al., 1998; Meslé and Vallin, in press).
All other eastern European countries, however, embarked on a new phase of
convergence in the last decade. The Czech Republic was the first of these countries to
re-establish progress at the very end of the 80s, followed by Poland and Hungary at the
start of the 90s, plus Slovakia, which is not shown in Fig. 4. Even Romania (and
Bulgaria, not represented here) now seem to have been entering this new stage of
progress for a couple of years (Meslé, 2002). Since 1991 life expectancy gains in the
Czech Republic and Poland have outpaced those in Japan, with an increase of 3.3 years
compared to Japan's 2.0 years. At that pace differential, it would take time for them to
catch up Japan (42 years for the Czech Republic and even 48 years for Poland). But the
trends are moving in the right direction. Furthermore, the comparison with Japan is not
really the most felicitous, since, as will be discussed later, Japan may already have
embarked on a third stage of the health transition. It is more readily obvious that the
Czech Republic and Poland are actually catching up a country like the Netherlands,
which will be examined in Section 3 as an example of a country that is completing stage
two of health transition but not yet entering stage three. From 1991 to 2000, its increase
in life expectancy was only 1.0 year compared to 3.3 in the Czech Republic and Poland.
3.2. The role of cardiovascular mortality
Over and above the fight against man-made diseases described by Omran as a feature of
the “third age” of his epidemiologic transition, the second stage of health transition
mainly relies on the reduction of cardio-vascular disease. This applies equally to the
divergence and convergence phases.
A clearer picture of the dominant role of cardio-vascular diseases can be gained by
examining age- and cause-specific mortality change contributions to life expectancyDemographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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differentials between two dates (Andreev (Note  4), 1982) for selected countries.
Bearing in mind that during that stage of health transition, East-West contrasts were
more marked for males than females, only the results for males are presented here.
Firstly, Figure 5 compares the breakdown of life expectancy changes in the United
Kingdom and Russia over the whole period 1965-2000.
The only common feature between the two countries is the positive impact of the
continuing decline in infant mortality, to which 1 year's life expectancy gain in both
countries can be credited, notwithstanding somewhat different cause-of-death
attributions (mainly “respiratory diseases” in Russia and “other diseases (Note 5)” in
the UK). That aside, most of the remaining increase in life expectancy in the UK (5.3
years) stems from the decrease in cardiovascular mortality at adult ages, accounting for
as much as 3.5 years, or more than 50% of the total gain of 6.4 years. Among the other
sources of gains at adult ages, the decline of “other diseases” and “all cancers” which
include “man made diseases” like smoking-related lung cancer plays an important role.
During this period, therefore, the United Kingdom clearly benefited from the decline in
those diseases which, according to Omran’s theory, were the main feature of the “third
age” of the epidemiologic transition, and has arguably completed the second stage of
health transition. Advances are made at all adult ages over 35, but culminate between
ages 60 and 70.
In Russia, by contrast, all these ages are affected by increasing cardio-vascular
mortality which alone is estimated to have cut 3 years off life expectancy. Another 3-
year loss was caused at the same time by a sharp rise in “injury and poisoning” deaths, a
category which, in Russia, includes alcoholism as well as road traffic accident, suicide,
homicide, etc. Russia therefore stands as textbook example of a country which still now
conforms to the Omran’s “third age”: so acute indeed is the pandemic of degenerative
and man-made diseases that the remaining decline in infectious diseases at young ages
no longer compensates for its spread. The same trends are observed in other republics
of the former USSR like Ukraine (Meslé and Vallin, 2003), Belarus (Andreev, 2001),
and even the Baltic countries until very recently (Note 6) (Hertrich and Meslé, 1999).Demographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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Source: UK: computed from WHO mortality database; Russia: Meslé et al., 1998.
Figure 5: Contribution of trends in age-specific mortality for seven main groups of
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3.3. The beginning of convergence in cardio-vascular mortality
The same can no longer be said of central European countries. In Poland, taken here as
an example, the negative trends reversed as early as 1991. During the period of
deterioration, from 1965 to 1991, the Polish pattern of age and cause-of-death
contribution to the decline of life expectancy is fairly similar to that of Russia
(Figure 6), with two noteworthy differences. One is that a still bigger life expectancy
gain resulted from a dramatic fall in infant mortality (which, alone, would have
produced a two-year gain) and, even at adult ages, significant gains were due to the
decline of infectious and respiratory mortality. During that time, Poland was actually
thus moving towards completion of the first stage of its health transition. The other is
that the impact of injury and poisoning deaths was much less pronounced than in Russia
and, conversely, that of cancer was more significant. Other than that, however, years of
life expectancy lost due to increasing cardio-vascular mortality were fairly comparable.
In fact, had the first stage of health transition been completed pre-1965, Poland would
have lost almost the same number of years of life expectancy as Russia in that period of
general divergence between East and West.
By contrast, since 1991, gains in Polish life expectancy are observed at all ages
from almost all causes (second graph of Figure 6). In fact, beyond the 0.5 year gained
from the decline of infant mortality, most of the gains at adult ages (2.2 years) are due
to the decline of cardio-vascular mortality (1.6 years).
To complete this picture of the major role played by cardio-vascular diseases
during the second stage of health transition, Figure 7 displays the annual trends of
cardio-vascular age-standardized mortality rates in France and the UK on one hand, and
in Russia, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic on the other. The graph was plotted
with a semi-logarithmic scale for comparability of the pace of trends. Aside from
France, which has for long been a case apart in the matter (Richard, 1987; Law and
Wald, 1999), all these countries were very close to each other in 1965.
Cardiovascular mortality has declined steadily and sharply in both France and the
UK from the outset, but has risen dramatically in Russia. In between these, Poland
showed an increase very similar to that of Russia until 1991, followed by a decrease
mirroring those of France and the UK. Hungary is a less clear-cut case, posting both
slower increases and decreases. No increase can be shown for the Czech Republic
because available data from the WHO database only start in 1985, but the decrease
exactly mirrors that of Poland.
It might be thought that the very similar paces of decline observed in Poland, the
Czech Republic, the UK and France in the last decade were not enough to produce any
convergence in life expectancy. But they did do so, partly because of the very wide
difference achieved in terms of level in 1991, and partly because the age structure of
cardiovascular mortality is much older in the UK and France than in Poland and theDemographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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Source: computed from WHO mortality database
Figure 6: Contribution of trends in age-specific mortality for seven main groups of
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Source: France: Meslé and Vallin, 1996; Russia: Meslé et al. 1998; other countries: computed from WHO mortality database.
Figure 7: Trends in male standardized mortality rate from cardiovascular diseases
since 1965 in 6 industrialised countries
Czech Republic. At higher levels of mortality, or with a younger age structure, the same
pace of mortality decrease produces a higher increase in life expectancy.Demographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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This dual phenomenon of divergence-convergence between western and eastern
industrialized countries is arguably the best example of the occurrence of a second stage
of health transition based mainly on the trends in man-made and cardio-vascular
diseases. Initially, the divergence appears with the emergence of a new pathway, re-
establishing progress in life expectancy after having gained almost all that could be
expected from the fight against infectious diseases in the previous stage. Some
countries, like Japan first followed by almost all western countries, were quick to
maximize the benefits of new technologies, and perhaps even more so, new means of
prevention against cardio-vascular diseases, while other countries, mainly in eastern
Europe, failed to do so. It is very likely that the failure of the former communist
countries was largely due to a double disadvantage. First, their economic difficulties
held back the dissemination of costly new technologies, and, second, the highly
centralised social system, perfectly suited to fighting infectious diseases, worked to
their disadvantage in getting individuals to take responsibility for their own health
through behavioural and lifestyle changes.
4. Toward a third stage: slowing the ageing process?
Looking more closely at the most recent trends in life expectancy for Western
industrialized countries, the question arises: are they already engaged in a third stage of
health transition (Figure 8)? For females in particular (right-hand chart, Figure 8), a
new divergence can be seen to have started after 1980. The process is less clear for
men, but it is noteworthy that male life expectancy is still consistently lower in 2000
than female life expectancy was in 1980. In Japan, for example, male life expectancy
was 77.4 years in 2000 when female life expectancy was already 78.8 in 1980. It is
even more marked in the USA, with 74.1 for males in 2000 against 77.4 for females in
1980, respectively.
Clearly, females are much further along the road of health transition than males,
and so much more likely to enter a new stage first, if there is one. At first glance, the
female graph of Figure 8 might seem to suggest a new stage starting with the very
marked divergence between Denmark and countries like France and Japan. While
progress slackens or even halts in the former from the 80s, it continues at a sustained
pace in France and Japan. From 1980 to 1995, female life expectancy gained only 0.7
year in Denmark (from 77.2 to 77.9) but as much as 3.5 years in France (78.4 to 81.9)
and even 4 years in Japan (78.8 to 82.8). More recently, Denmark finally re-established
progress, gaining 1.4 years (to 79.3) in five years while France gained 0.8 and Japan 2
years, which could be interpreted as the starting point of a new phase of convergence.Demographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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Source: France: Vallin and Meslé, 2001; other countries: various statistical or demographic yearbooks
Figure 8: Trends in life expectancy since 1980 in some Western industrialised
countries
Meanwhile, the Netherlands also entered a long period of stagnation in 1988,
where female life expectancy increased by only 0.3 year in more than a decade. Even
Sweden experienced a brief halt from 1984 to 1989 before re-establishing progress.
Figure 9 displays the contribution of age and cause mortality changes to female life
expectancy trends observed in Japan, France, the Netherlands and Denmark from 1980
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Source: France: Meslé and Vallin, 1996; other countries: computed from WHO mortality database
Figure 9: Contribution of trends in age-specific mortality for seven main groups of
causes in changes in female life expectancy from 1980 to 1998 or 1999 in
Japan, France, the Netherlands, and Denmark
As was seen in Figure 5 for the United Kingdom during the period 1965-1997, the
decline of cardiovascular mortality account for the greatest share of life expectancy
gains in the four countries, but the biggest contributions do not all come from the same
ages. Whereas adult ages were formerly the main contributors, the biggest influence in
the last two decades has been that of the oldest age groups. This is especially so in
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between 1980 and 1999, almost 1.7 years were exclusively due to cardiovascular
decline at age 85+, twice more than for the impact of the same cause at age 80-84! In
France, too, the impact of the decline in cardiovascular mortality mainly comes from
the oldest age groups. In both countries, that impact increases very sharply with age.
In light of this increasing role of the oldest ages in the decline of cardio-vascular
mortality, the idea can be entertained of a change in the nature of the cardio-vascular
diseases involved. Increasing advances in the fight against these diseases are tied up
with more general progress against ageing. In Japan, cerebrovascular diseases have for
several decades accounted for the greatest share of the total reduction in cardiovascular
diseases; likewise, more recently, in France. The current cause-of-death classification is
certainly not sufficiently ageing-related to allow a pinpointing of the impact of current
strategies in the field of biological ageing, but it seems that the new approaches toward
the elderly developed in the past two decades may be creating a new stage of health
transition, and that a handful of countries have already gone some way down that new
road, while others are lagging. In Denmark and the Netherlands, the impact of
cardiovascular decline is also greater and more marked at older ages, but still much less
so than in France and Japan. But both countries also show quite significant negative
effects of increased cause-by-age-specific mortality.
For that reason, it is important to distinguish precisely those periods in which life
expectancy has increased from those where it has stagnated. In the case of Denmark, as
discussed earlier, female life expectancy stagnated from 1980 to 1995 before progress
suddenly resumed in that year. Figure 10 displays the contributions of age and cause
mortality trends to changes in life expectancy for the two periods 1980-1995 and 1995-
1998. In the first period, Danish female life expectancy might have made small gains,
had only cardiovascular diseases been involved, but that progress was completely
obliterated by reverse trends in other causes of death like cancer, respiratory diseases
and digestive diseases, which in fact are mainly smoking- and drink-related here. In
other words, notwithstanding progress in cardiovascular diseases, increases in life
expectancy were halted by a deterioration in man-made diseases. Despite that, just as in
France and Japan, there is a discernible general move of the contribution of
cardiovascular decline to life expectancy increases towards older ages. That is very
clearly demonstrated by a comparison of the two parts of Figure 10: in the 3 most recent
years, the impact of cardiovascular decline is not only more significant than in the
previous 15, it is also much more concentrated around the oldest ages. And it is
particularly noteworthy that during these 3 years, that impact is even far more
pronounced in Denmark than in Japan and France. This signifies that in this respect,
Denmark actually started to catch up on France and Japan. However, once again, that
increasing source of progress is partly countered by a continuing worsening of man-
made diseases at adult ages. To put it simply, not only have Danish women been late inDemographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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entering the third stage of health transition, they also failed to complete the second one
in terms of man-made diseases.
The Netherlands is very much a case apart. First, female life expectancy continued
to increase during the early 80s, but halted in 1988 never to resume until now. Second,
the positive influence of a decline in cardiovascular diseases, once again increasingly at
the oldest ages, is still even recently much less great than in Denmark. Third, since
1988 the small improvement made possible as regards cardiovascular diseases is
completely cancelled out by different causes involving very different ages from those in
Denmark.
As in Figure 10 for Denmark, Figure 11 compares the Netherlands to Japan and
France for two periods: 1980-1988 when female life expectancy is still rising in the
Netherlands, and 1988-2000 when it is stagnating. During the first period, most of the
progress is due to a reduction in cardiovascular diseases – as in France and Japan - but
the ages involved are still not the oldest ones. It is very likely that at this stage the
Netherlands is only completing the second stage of health transition. Obviously, it is
doing so on better terms than Denmark, since man-made diseases are no longer a cause
of reduction of the years of life expectancy gained. However, at the oldest ages (85+), a
new problem emerges with the negative effects of the “other causes” group, which will
assume even greater significance in the second period.
It is true to say that in the Netherlands also, the impact of cardiovascular disease
decline involves the oldest ages more in the period 1988 to 1999 than in the previous
period, and this may be assumed to be related to the third stage of the health transition.
But , it is so low overall that it is very clear that the Netherlands are very late, and slow,
in entering that third stage, which differentiates it significantly from Denmark where
that impact has been even more marked than in France and Japan for the last three
years.
Also in the equation, the specific problem mentioned earlier of “other causes” at
age 85+ assumes a significant scale: at these ages, losses in years of life expectancy by
that group of causes are actually outweighing the gains due to cardiovascular disease
decline. And this is compounded by an additional negative effect of respiratory
diseases. All told, trends in mortality at the oldest ages have a negative effect on female
life expectancy. This is very far from a new stage in the health transition devoted to the
fight against ageing!Demographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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Source: France: Meslé and Vallin, 1996; other countries: computed from WHO mortality database
Figure 10: Contribution of trends in age-specific mortality for seven main groups of
causes in two stages of changes in female life expectancy between 1980
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Source: France: Meslé and Vallin, 1996; other countries: computed from WHO mortality database
Figure 11: Contribution of trends in age-specific mortality for seven main groups of
causes in two stages of changes in female life expectancy between 1980
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In fact, within the vague group of “other causes” only one specific cause-of-death
group is involved in that process: mental disorders. This is to be discussed because the
phenomenon of growing mortality by mental disorder may be a statistical artefact as
well as a substantive change. Obviously, the Netherlands might possibly be more
affected than other countries by the threat of a “pandemic of mental disorders and
disabilities” conjectured by some authors like Gruenberg (1978) or Kramer (1980). But
it is equally highly possible that recent changes in registration and coding practices
have assigned increasing importance to mental disorders as causes of death. The most
noted example is Alzheimer's disease, which suddenly spoke to the medical moment in
the 80s among physicians in charge of cause of death certification (Meslé and Vallin,
1996a). But, more generally, mental disorders, are increasingly recognised as real
diseases and specific causes of death rather than the expected and unavoidable result of
an ageing process which is not itself considered as an underlying cause of death.
If the artefact hypothesis is correct, it means that deaths accounted as from mental
disorders in the Netherlands would have been classified differently, and very probably
among cardiovascular diseases, in other countries like France or Japan. This would then
mean that gains in life expectancy due to cardiovascular mortality decline are
underestimated in France and Japan, and the contrast between the Netherlands and these
two countries for that group of causes would be even more marked than shown on
Figure  11. Thus, whatever the reality regarding mental disorders, the comparison
between Japan or France and the Netherlands clearly points up the idea of a third stage
of health transition centred on the ageing process which first induces a new divergence
before ending with a convergence (of which Denmark may be drawing the benefits to-
day).
5. Conclusion
We tried to show in this article that it is quite possible to integrate Abdel Omran's
original epidemiologic transition (a valid framework for the explanation of health
progress performed before the mid-20
th century) unchanged into a broader scheme that
encompasses both new advances in health and the extraordinary diversity of situations
that prevail across the world. Instead of artificially adding a fourth age to the three
“ages” of Omran’s theory to account for the cardiovascular revolution (Olshansky and
Ault, 1986; Rogers and Hackenberg, 1987; Omran, 1998), and even a fifth to allow for
AIDS (Olshansky et al., 1998), it is arguably much more realistic to consider Omran’s
epidemiologic transition as the first stage of a global process of health transition which
develops into several stages depending on different major changes in health strategies.
Because not all societies are equally prepared to innovate or drew the benefits ofDemographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
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innovation from outside, such major changes naturally result first in a more or less
acute process of divergence followed by a process of convergence when late-entering
countries become able to catch up the pioneers.
We have identified here three of these major stages corresponding respectively to
the vanquishing of infectious diseases (in fact Omran’s epidemiologic transition), the
cardiovascular revolution, and finally the fight against ageing. That identification is still
incomplete because historical data are lacking for many countries, but also because the
course of events differs from one country to the other each time. In fact, these stages
occur at different times according to countries or groups of countries. And it is also
possible to enter a new stage without having completed the previous one. For example,
some developing countries have very probably entered the second stage by reducing
cardiovascular mortality before fully reducing infectious disease mortality. Likewise, it
was seen that Denmark probably very recently entered the third stage before completely
addressing the issue of man-made diseases which typify the second stage.
Furthermore, it might be not impossible to find cases in which the order of the
stages is varied. In particular, it might have been expected that new, highly effective
treatments against cancer would have to be developed before any success against ageing
was possible. The recent history of industrialized countries seems to suggest the
contrary, but other countries may follow that scenario. More generally, there is nothing
to say that countries still involved in the first stage, like many African countries, might
not follow a different path in future.
This article also focussed on only one universe to which that scheme can apply:
countries. There would be a useful purpose in taking it further to see how far it might
apply to trends and differences in mortality observed within countries, either in terms of
internal geographical variations or even in terms of economic, social, cultural, gender,
and other differences. It is a matter of record, for example, that in the case of French
départements, substantial convergence is observed across the 19
th century (Caselli and
Vallin, 2002). It would be useful to gather large sets of historical data on differential
mortality and to try to analyse them from that angle. It is a field wide open for further
investigation.Demographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
-- Determinants of Diverging Trends in Mortality --
http://www.demographic-research.org 39
Notes
1.   That idea of convergence is a general basis of the demographic transition theory,
not only for life expectancy but also for fertility, and it is very commonly referred
to in works related to the application of the theory. It has been discussed by various
authors (see, for example, Coleman 2002).
2.   Olshansky and Ault: "A fourth stage of the epidemiologic transition". The other
authors refer to a "new" or "hybristic" stage.
3.   Male trajectories being more affected by short-term variations due to exceptional
events like wars, it was thought preferable to use female trajectories to look at
long-term trends.
4.   Andreev’s method is quite equivalent to those proposed by others, simultaneously
(Pollard, 1982) or a bit later (Arriaga, 1984; Pressat, 1985).
5.   In fact at that age, most of the “other diseases” group correspond to perinatal and
congenital diseases.
6.   It seems increasingly likely that after the 1993-94 socio-economic crisis, the
progress observed in the three Baltic countries is more than simply being re-
established (Meslé, 2002).
7.   Data were available until 1999 in Japan, France and the Netherlands, and until
1998 in Denmark.Demographic Research – Special Collection 2: Article 2
-- Determinants of Diverging Trends in Mortality --
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